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Perceived Fairness of
Demand-based Pricing
for Restaurants
Variable pricing in restaurants—for example, by day part or weekends versus weekdays—
is likely to be okay with customers provided the different price schemes seem fair.
BY SHERYL E. KIMES AND JOCHEN WIRTZ
Revenue management consists of two strategic levers:duration control and demand-based pricing.1 Somerestaurant managers try to manage duration by chang-
ing their service delivery (for example, by speeding up the
delivery process),2 but have been reluctant to apply demand-
based pricing for fear of possible customer dissatisfaction.
While restaurants do use demand-based pricing when offer-
ing promotions such as happy hours and early bird specials,
they have been loathe to vary prices by time of day, day of
week, or table location.
Restaurant managers’ fears may, in fact, have some basis in
reality. As explained in a moment, researchers have found that
customers refuse to patronize companies that they perceive as
unfair.3 If demand-based pricing in restaurants is viewed as
unfair by patrons, the restaurant could suffer a loss of business.
1 See, for example: S.E. Kimes and R.B. Chase, “The Strategic Levers of
Yield Management,” Journal of Service Research, Vol. 1, No. 2 (November
1998), pp. 156–166; and S.E. Kimes, R.B. Chase, S. Choi, E.N. Ngonzi,
and P.Y. Lee, “Restaurant Revenue Management,” Cornell Hotel and Res-
taurant Administration Quarterly, Vol. 40, No. 3 (June 1998), pp. 40–45.
2 See, for example: B. Sill and R. Decker, “Applying Capacity-management
Science: The Case of Browns Restaurants,” Cornell Hotel and Restaurant
Administration Quarterly, Vol. 40, No. 3 (June 1998), pp. 22–30; S.E.
Kimes, D.I. Barrash, and J.E. Alexander, “Developing a Restaurant Revenue-
management Strategy,” Cornell Hotel and Restaurant Administration Quar-
terly, Vol. 34, No. 5 (October 1999), pp. 18–30; and B. Sill, “Capacity
Management: Making Your Service-delivery System More Productive,”
Cornell Hotel and Restaurant Administration Quarterly, Vol. 33, No. 1 (Feb-
ruary 1991), pp. 77–87.
3 See: D. Kahneman, J.L. Knetsch, and R.H. Thaler, “Fairness and the
Assumption of Economics,” Journal of Business, Vol. 59 (October 1986),
pp. S285–S300; and R.H. Thaler, “Mental Accounting and Consumer
Choice,” Marketing Science, Vol. 4, No. 3 (Summer 1985), pp. 199–214.
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The intent of the research described here was to
determine how customers react to several
demand-based-pricing strategies in the restaurant
industry. Specifically, we examined the perceived
fairness of the following demand-based
approaches: (1) differential lunch-versus-dinner
pricing, (2) differential weekday-versus-weekend
pricing, (3) time-of-day pricing (e.g., early bird
specials), (4) coupon pricing (including re-
strictions), and (5) table-location pricing (e.g.,
charging extra for a table with a view).
Furthermore, we explored whether framing those
demand-based-pricing mechanisms as discounts
rather than surcharges would make them more
acceptable (fair) to restaurant patrons.
Issues to Consider
Restaurants are often reluctant to use demand-
based pricing because of potential customer back-
lash. If increased prices cannot be justified either
by higher associated costs or through certain de-
sirable conditions, customers may view demand-
based-pricing policies as unfair. The issue of fair-
ness has been studied extensively in a variety of
non-hospitality industries,4 and one of us (Sheryl
Kimes) studied perceived fairness in the hotel and
airline industries.5 In general, it was found that
fair behavior on the part of operators is instrumen-
tal to the maximization of their long-term profits.
Consumers may perceive demand-based
pricing as being unfair for at least two reasons.
First, they may view the higher prices during
high-demand times to be more than their
reference price, or their reference price may
already have been shifted downward because of
lower prices during low-demand periods. In
either event, the “new,” higher regular prices may
be perceived as less fair than before. Second, the
restaurant may not be seen as providing more
value for the higher price, which would violate
consumer beliefs about “dual entitlement” (as
explained below). We first discuss the effect that
demand-based pricing can have on consumer
reference prices, followed by an examination of
the potential effect of dual-entitlement beliefs on
perceived fairness of demand-based-pricing
strategies.
Reference prices. The terms “reference
transaction” and “reference price” are often used
when discussing fairness. A reference transaction
is how customers think a transaction should be
conducted and a reference price is how much
customers think a service (or product) should
cost. Reference prices can come from the price
last paid, the price most frequently paid, and what
other customers say they paid for similar
offerings, as well as from market prices and posted
prices. For example, customers may know that
they generally pay about $25 for dinner at a
particular restaurant, and so their reference price
for dinner at that restaurant is $25.
To assess a transaction’s fairness, customers
often rely on reference prices.6 For consumers to
perceive demand-based pricing as fair, their
reference prices would have to shift in line with
the restaurant’s variable-pricing schedule. This
may be difficult for operators to achieve for two
reasons. First, the low price used during low-
demand periods may become the consumer’s
reference price and may make future purchases
at the regular or peak rate seem unfair. Second,
consumers may believe that the restaurant is
charging them higher prices to reap higher profits
without having increased the customer’s value,
violating the patron’s beliefs about dual
entitlement, which is discussed next.
Dual entitlement. The principle of dual
entitlement holds that most customers believe
that they are entitled to a reasonable price and
that firms are entitled to a reasonable profit.7
Customers are likely to view demand-based
pricing as unbalancing that relationship by either
4See, for example: M.C. Campbell, “Why Did You Do That?
The Important Role of Inferred Motive in Perceptions of
Price Fairness,” Journal of Product and Brand Management,
Vol. 8, No. 2 (1999), pp. 145–152; M.C. Campbell, “Per-
ceptions of Price Unfairness: Antecedents and Conse-
quences,” Journal of Marketing Research, Vol. 36, No. 2 (June
1999), pp. 187–199; Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler, pp.
S285–S300; P.J. Kaufmann, G. Ortmeyer and N.C. Smith,
“Fairness in Consumer Pricing,” Journal of Consumer Policy,
Vol. 14 (1991), pp. 117–140; Thaler,  pp. 199–214; and
J.E. Urbany, T.J. Madden, and P.R. Dickson, “All’s Not Fair
in Pricing: An Initial Look at the Dual Entitlement Prin-
ciple,” Marketing Letters, Vol. 1, No. 1 (1989), pp. 17–25.
5S.E. Kimes, “Perceived Fairness of Yield Management,”
Cornell Hotel and Restaurant Administration Quarterly,
Vol. 29, No. 1 (February 1994), pp. 22–29.
6 Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler, pp. S285–S300.
7 See: Ibid.; and Thaler, pp. 199–214.
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increasing the value to the firm without increasing
the value to the customer, or by decreasing the
value to the customer without a substantial
enough price reduction. As a result, customers
may view such transactions as unfair. For
example, if a restaurant increases its menu prices
for no apparent reasons, it is increasing the firm’s
value without increasing the customer’s, and
customers may then view the transaction as
unfair. Similarly, if a restaurant imposes
substantial restrictions on customers in exchange
for only a somewhat lower price, customers may
view the transaction as unfair.
Two hypotheses emerge from the principle of
dual entitlement.8 First, customers feel that
raising the price to maintain profits is fair.
Therefore, if costs increase, customers consider
it reasonable for the price to increase accordingly.
For example, after the foot-and-mouth disease
outbreak in the United Kingdom in 2000, meat
prices increased and some restaurants raised their
menu prices to account for the increased costs.
Based on the principle of dual entitlement, those
price increases would be viewed as fair. Second,
customers believe that raising the price simply
to increase profits is unfair. For example, after
Hurricane Andrew in the early 1990s, many
companies charged extremely high prices for
food, water, tools, and supplies. As predicted by
the principle of dual entitlement, consumers
considered these practices to be extremely unfair.9
(Indeed, in some instances such price gouging is
also illegal.)
If the principle of dual entitlement holds true,
some forms of revenue management may be
perceived as unfair. Customers generally view
price differences as fair if they perceive them to
be justified, but consumers view unjustified price
increases to be unfair. If customers believe that
the transaction is different from the reference
transaction only in price, they may believe that
the firm is receiving more than its reference price
and is behaving unfairly. One way of increasing
the perceived fairness of demand-based pricing
is the use of price fences, which are discussed next.
Rate fences. Price fences are designed to allow
customers to segment themselves based on their
willingness to pay, their behavior, and their
needs.10 Price fences offer consumers discounted
prices but impose rules and regulations at every
level of discount to balance the perceived value
for the different market segments, and to avoid
automatically offering a discount to customers
who are willing to pay a higher price.11 Fences
may include requirements for advance purchase,
advance payment, cancellation and change
restrictions, refund penalties, time-of-use
restrictions, and minimum-purchase require-
ments. For example, airlines offer many different
fares, but to qualify for a deeply discounted fare,
customers may have to make their reservation
and purchase the ticket far in advance, stay over
a Saturday night, and accept steep cancellation
or rebooking penalties. The traveler who is
unwilling to accept the restrictions does not
qualify for the lower rate and usually ends up
paying a higher fare.
The purpose of a rate fence is to create
customer segments and justify why different
people pay different prices. To be perceived as
fair, fences need to be logical, transparent,
upfront, and fixed so that they cannot be
circumvented.12 Essentially, there are two types
of rate fence that companies can use to customize
their prices: physical and non-physical.13
If a restaurant increases its menu prices for
no apparent reasons, customers may view
subsequent transactions as unfair.
8 Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler, pp. S285–S300.
9 M.C. Campbell, pp. 145–152.
10 R.B. Hanks, R.P. Noland, and R.G. Cross, “Discounting
in the Hotel Industry: A New Approach,” Cornell Hotel and
Restaurant Administration Quarterly, Vol. 33, No. 3 (June
1992), pp. 40–45.
11 Ibid.
12 D.J. Bennett, “Discount-fare Market Research, 1981–
1983,” 63rd Annual Meeting of the Transportation Research
Board, January 1984, p. 2.
13 Hanks, Noland, and Cross, pp. 40–45.
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who make a reservation over a month ahead of
time might pay less), buyer characteristics
(frequent customers might pay less, or get free-
of-charge extras), and controlled availability
(customers with coupons will pay less).
In our study we explored the perceived fairness
of five potential fences for restaurants, specifically
the three time-based fences (differential lunch-
versus-dinner, weekday-versus-weekend, and
time-of-day pricing), one physical fence (table
location), and one controlled-availability fence
(two meals for the price of one).
Framing of price differences. We also
investigated how customers react to the way price
differences are presented. Specifically, we wanted
to know whether a fence framed as a price decrease
would be evaluated more favorably than the same
fence presented as a price increase. We turned to
behavioral decision theory and prospect theory to
help address our question.15 Behavioral decision
theory holds that the way in which an alternative
is presented (its framing) affects its evaluation by
potential customers. Presentations that emphasize
customer gains are preferable to economically
equivalent frames that emphasize customer losses.
For example, consider a restaurant with a static
menu that decides to establish two sets of menu
prices. The restaurant can present the price
differences in two ways: it can either present the
lunch prices as 20-percent lower than the dinner
prices (framed as a gain from the diner’s
perspective) or it can present the dinner prices as
20-percent higher than the lunch prices (framed
as a loss). The situations are economically
equivalent, but behavioral decision theory holds
that customers will view the “reduced” prices
more favorably, and that the restaurant should
frame the price difference accordingly. In this
study, we explored the effect of framing on the
perceived fairness of price fences.
The Study
In an attempt to answer the question of how cus-
tomers react to demand-based pricing, we con-
ducted an in-person survey of 157 hotel guests
at Cornell University’s Statler Hotel. All survey
EXHIBIT 1
Fairness ratings of rate fences
Mean Overall
Demand-based pricing fences (STD) mean (STD)
Differential lunch-versus-dinner pricing
  expressed as
• Surcharge 3.53 (1.84) 3.40 (1.83)
• Discount 3.28 (1.82)
Differential weekday-versus-weekend pricing
  expressed as
• Surcharge 4.34* (1.96) 4.04 (1.88)
• Discount 3.73 (1.76)
Differential time-of-day pricing
  expressed as
• Surcharge 3.11* (1.74) 2.71 (1.63)
• Discount 2.29 (1.42)
Differential table-location pricing
  expressed as
• Surcharge 5.14* (1.99) 4.39 (2.07)
• Discount 3.65 (1.89)
Two-for-one coupons
  expressed as
• Restrictions 2.30 (1.64) 2.22 (1.50)
• Without restrictions 2.13 (1.35)
Notes: The Likert-type scale used was 1 = “extremely fair” to 7 = “extremely unfair,”
and “STD” = standard deviation.
*The difference between the two framing conditions is significant at p > 0.05,
  two-tailed.
15 D. Kahneman and A. Tversky, “Prospect Theory: An
Analysis of Decision under Risk,” Econometrica, Vol. 47,
No. 2 (March 1979), pp. 263–291.
Physical rate fences include location,
furnishings, and presence of amenities or a view.
Non-physical rate fences include time of
consumption, transaction characteristics, buyer
characteristics, and controlled availability.14 In a
restaurant context, physical rate fences include
table location (a better table commands a higher
price), view (tables with a scenic view cost more),
and amenities (tables in a private room with fresh-
cut flowers cost more). Non-physical rate fences
might include time (weekend dinners might cost
more or meals consumed before 6:00 PM might
cost less), transaction characteristics (customers
14 R.J. Dolan and H. Simon, Power Pricing (New York: The
Free Press, 1996).
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interviews were conducted by trained individu-
als who approached hotel guests in the lobby and
asked them to participate in a short survey.
Five different scenarios were developed that
each described one of the following demand-
based pricing fences: lunch-versus-dinner pricing,
weekday-versus-weekend pricing, time-of-day
pricing, coupon pricing, and table-location
pricing. Respondents were asked to evaluate the
fairness of each scenario, with “1” being extremely
fair and “7” being extremely unfair. Two
demographic-data questions also were asked,
namely, frequency of dining out and age, and the
interviewers recorded each guest’s gender.
Two versions of the survey were developed.
The same questions were asked on each survey,
but the price changes were presented variably
either as a discount or as a surcharge. We wanted
to see whether customers reacted differently based
on how the price differences were framed. A mix
of question types was asked on each survey. Each
respondent completed only one survey.
Results
Our findings are presented in Exhibits 1 and 2,
and next we discuss those findings on the vari-
ous demand-based-pricing mechanisms.
Lunch-versus-dinner pricing. Many
restaurants offer similar lunch and dinner menus
but charge lower prices for lunch. The lower
prices are usually associated with smaller portion
sizes. Our first question concerned pricing of
lunch and dinner menus. Respondents were
presented with either the premium or the
discount scenario (the discount condition is
presented in parentheses for the purposes of this
analysis), and were asked to evaluate its fairness
on our Likert-type scale (1 = extremely fair and
7 = extremely unfair).
A restaurant has two menus: lunch and dinner.
The dinner (lunch) menu has slightly higher
(lower) prices even though the menu items
are the same as on the lunch (dinner) menu.
Respondents viewed different prices for lunch
and dinner menus as reasonably fair (mean =
3.40). The wording of the question did not seem
to matter much. When the dinner price was pre-
sented as “slightly higher,” the average rating was
3.53, while when the lunch price was presented
as “slightly lower,” the average rating was 3.28.
The mean difference of 0.25 between the two
scenarios was not significant (t = 0.40).
The results imply that restaurants can charge
different prices for the same menu items during
lunch and dinner periods without risking
customers’ perceptions of unfairness. (There is
an assumption, however, that paying more for
dinner means that the customer will get larger
portions or a special presentation relative to the
lunch-menu fare.)
Weekday-versus-weekend pricing. Most
restaurants have a higher demand on weekend
evenings than they do during the rest of the week.
Proponents of demand-based pricing would
argue that weekend menu prices should be raised
to respond to that high demand. Most restaurant
EXHIBIT 2
Consumers’ fairness perceptions of demand-based
pricing tools
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
Lunch Weekday versus Time-of-day Two-for-one Table
versus dinner weekend coupons location
Price expressed as a surcharge
Price expressed as a discount
Overall
1 = extremely fair;    4  = neutral;    7 = extremely unfair
Neutral

3.28
3.53 3.40
4.34
3.73
4.04
3.11
2.29
2.71
5.14
3.65
4.39
2.30 2.13 2.22
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managers are reluctant to pursue this policy explicitly
because they fear customer dissatisfaction. Instead,
many restaurants implicitly charge high prices for
weekend dinners through such practices as
chalkboard menus and high-priced “specials.”
Our second question concerned different prices
for weekend and weekday menus.
A restaurant has different dinner menus for
weekdays and weekends. The menus are the
same except that the weekend (weekday)
prices are higher (lower) than the weekday
(weekend) prices.
Respondents viewed different prices for weekend
and weekday menus as still acceptable (mean =
4.04). In this case, however, the framing of the
question seemed to matter. When the weekday
menu was presented as having lower prices,
respondents viewed the practice as significantly more
acceptable (mean = 3.73) than when the weekend
menu was presented as having higher prices (mean
= 4.34; t = 2.06).
Those results imply that customers view different
prices for weekend and weekday menus as relatively
acceptable. If a restaurant decides to pursue this
practice, it should carefully word the new policy so
that the weekday menus are presented as offering a
discount off the weekend-menu prices.
Time-of-day pricing. Many restaurants offer
happy hours and early bird specials, and some have
expanded into other time-of-day pricing schemes.
For example, in Hong Kong the Peninsula Hotel’s
Kowloon restaurant charges different prices for its
buffet depending on the time of day. The practice
has been popular and financially successful. The
Sheraton hotel in Stockholm has experimented with
time-of-day pricing for its main restaurant and has
thereby increased revenue. Our third question dealt
with how customers evaluated time-of-day pricing.
A restaurant has two sets of prices. If you eat
dinner between 6 PM and 8 PM (before 6 PM or
after 8 PM), you pay 20 percent more (less) than
the normal price and if you eat before
6 PM or after 8 PM (between 6 PM and 8 PM), you
pay the regular price. The restaurant advertises
this policy and makes sure customers are
aware of the prices.
Respondents viewed time-of-day pricing as fair
(mean = 2.71), and the wording of the question
seemed to matter. When the scenario was presented
as 20-percent lower prices before 6:00 PM or after
8:00 PM, the respondents viewed the price variability
as significantly fairer (mean = 2.29) than when the
price differential was presented as being 20-percent
higher between 6:00 PM and 8:00 PM (mean = 3.11;
t = 3.24).
Those results imply that restaurants can, in
general, use time-of-day pricing without incurring
customer wrath. If a restaurant decides to use time-
of-day pricing, however, it should be careful to frame
the prices as a discount, not as a premium.
Two-for-one coupons. Many restaurants
participate in two-for-one coupon promotions in
an attempt to build demand during slow periods
and to make the restaurant attractive to those who
might not try it without an incentive. Whatever
the restaurant’s goal, consumers who use two-for-
one coupons often purchase additional items, which
leads to increased revenue for the restaurant. In the
fourth question, respondents were asked to evaluate
this scenario.
A restaurant participates in a two-for-one
coupon program. Customers can use the
coupons for two-for-one dinners at any time
except on Friday or Saturday night (at any time
on Sundays through Thursdays).
Respondents considered two-for-one coupon
programs to be very fair (mean = 2.22), and the
framing of the question did not seem to matter.
When the coupons were offered with restrictions
(e.g., anytime except on Friday or Saturday night),
respondents rated the policy as marginally less
acceptable (mean = 2.30) than when they were
presented with no restrictions (mean = 2.13), but
the difference was not significant (t = 0.66).
Those results imply that two-for-one coupons
can be a valuable and popular tool for restaurants.
Customers view their use as extremely fair, and a
restaurant should be able to use the coupons to help
build demand during slow periods.
Table location. Our final scenario concerned
charging different prices based on the physical
location of the tables. Some restaurants, most
notably those located in sports stadiums and those
with scenic window views, already explicitly charge
a premium for desirable tables. For example,
TGIFridays at Phoenix’s Bank One Stadium charges
a higher price for tables located near the field than
it does for tables farther away. Other restaurants
implicitly charge a premium for desirable tables,
for example, when a customer can obtain
preferential seating by tipping the maître d’. Such
an allowance is essentially charging more for the
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desirable table (although the maître d’ is making
the additional money, not the restaurant).
Respondents were asked to evaluate the following
scenario.
A restaurant has a beautiful view and most
customers like to have tables near the window
so they can better see the view. The restaurant
charges a $20 premium (offers a $20 discount)
for tables next to (away from) the window.
Respondents viewed this practice as moderately
unacceptable (mean = 4.39), but their evaluation
varied by how the question was framed. When the
price was presented as a $20 premium, respondents
viewed it as significantly less acceptable (mean =
5.14) than when it was presented as a $20 savings
(mean = 3.65; t = 4.80).
Our findings suggest that restaurants have to be
careful if they decide to charge a higher price for
premium tables, as consumers perceive this practice
as somewhat unfair. If restaurants advertise a lower
price for non-premium tables, customers are likely
to view that policy as more acceptable than if the
restaurant explicitly charges a higher price for
premium tables. Also, although not tested in this
study, a strong rationale for discriminatory table-
location pricing might make it more acceptable. For
example, it might be perceived as somewhat unfair
in restaurants where the view is not a core part of
the value proposition. However, where table location
is part of the core-value proposition—such as in a
revolving restaurant in the highest building in a
metropolis or inside sports venues—differential
pricing might be more acceptable to customers.
Also, restaurants can add physical fences in addition
to table location (e.g., having a separate section for
corporate clients or VIP regulars), and “hide” the
surcharge in minimum per-guest checks or high
cover charges.
Summary and Conclusions
Our results show that restaurant patrons consider
demand-based pricing in the form of coupons (two
for the price of one), time-of-day, and lunch-
versus-dinner pricing as fair. Variable weekday-
versus-weekend pricing was perceived as neutral to
slightly unfair. Table-location pricing was seen as
somewhat unfair, with potential negative consumer
reaction to that practice. Furthermore, we explored
whether framing demand-based pricing as discounts
or surcharges would make a difference. We found
that demand-based pricing presented as discounts
made the differential prices seem fairer in the con-
sumers’ eyes, and therefore less likely to have a nega-
tive effect on consumers’ perceptions and reactions.
Our findings provide restaurant operators with
some useful guidelines, but those do not guarantee
that all guests may willingly accept demand-based-
pricing practices. Therefore, when developing
demand-based pricing using fences, restaurant
operators must make sure that the rate fences are
easy to explain and administer, and that customers
can understand the reasoning behind them. This
will make it easier for front-line employees to pacify
unhappy or confused customers, and to recover the
service if necessary. Also, the positioning of demand-
based pricing to staff members and to customers
should be as a win–win situation. It needs to be
emphasized that the variable pricing allows patrons
to choose prices that suit their needs and, by having
tight fences, patrons who see high value in a good
view, a desirable table, or eating dinner during peak
times are much more likely to get the capacity and
service they value.16 Accordingly, increasing
profitability via demand-based pricing does not have
to come at the expense of customer satisfaction and
loyalty.  
© 2001, Cornell University; an invited article.
16 J. Wirtz, J.P.T. Ho, and P.G. Patterson, “Yield Manage-
ment: Resolving Potential Customer and Employee Con-
flicts,” The NUS Business School Research Paper
Series, No. 2001-026 (Mkt), 2001, National University of
Singapore.
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